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Since its adoption by the World Medical Association (WMA) in 
1964, the Declaration of Helsinki (DoH) has become embedded 
in national and international codes, laws and court judgements in 
cases involving allegations of abuse in clinical trials. Some critics 
have even suggested that the latest version of the DoH (2008) should 
be rejected and the principles governing research should be drawn 
instead from UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (UDBHR).1 
In response, this paper argues that the tensions and alleged conflicts 
between Helsinki and human rights instruments are overstated, and 
that the latest version of the DoH is an important complement to 
human rights instruments in protecting the rights of disadvantaged 
populations and participants in biomedical research.
The case against Helsinki
In the past decade, revisions to the DoH have been criticised on 
two broad fronts. First, human rights groups have accused Helsinki 
of diluting universal ethical standards of care by allowing placebos 
to be used instead of the best proven treatment in developing 
countries. Critics say this ‘dilution’ introduces double standards – 
based on economics, convenience and efficiency – that should be 
anathema to any physician or patient.2 
Secondly, the changes in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the 2004 version of 
the DoH, which were introduced partly in response to pressure from 
advocates of placebos as the ‘golden’ clinical and scientific standard, 
did not satisfy the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).3 For some 
years the FDA had viewed the DoH standards as too stringent, and 
endorsed drug developers’ concerns that the requirement that drugs 
should be tested against the best current standard would make it 
harder to test their efficacy and drive up the cost of drug development. 
According to Robert Temple, director of the Office of Medical Policy of 
the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, the WMA has been 
driven by concerns for ‘social justice’ rather than the ‘ethics of clinical 
trials.’4 Since 2004, the FDA has dropped the DoH in favour of the less 
exacting standards of the International Conference on Harmonisation 
of Good Clinical Practice.
More recently, there have been calls to reject the 2008 version of the 
DoH and replace it with the principled human rights framework of 
the UDBHR (2005).5 The critics are associated with a South American 
bioethics network, Redbioetica, which operates under the umbrella 
of UNESCO. The UNESCO website describes Redbioetica as ‘an 
organisation composed of institutions and investigators that serves 
as a new tool of interdisciplinary exchange of ideas to the subjects on 
bioethics in the region’. The website provides a list of the organisations 
involved, but no details of the members of the network.6 
In 2010, the Declaracion de Cordoba was issued at the end of a 
conference held in Argentina and attended by researchers from 11 
South American countries. The declaration criticises the ‘weakening’ 
of the benefit-sharing requirements in the 2008 version of the DoH, 
and the DoH’s failure to uphold a universal and uniform standard of 
care in biomedical research trials. It calls for a shift to the UDBHR and, 
specifically, for research to be conducted under the principles on 
benefit sharing detailed in the UDBHR’s Article 15.5
Overall, the criticisms point to an alleged gap, or worse, a failure by 
Helsinki to comply with international standards of justice and human 
rights in the conduct of clinical trials in developing countries.
Arguably, the proposal to demote Helsinki as the international, 
authoritative source of ethical principles on the conduct of 
medical research is very serious. It could have the unintended 
effect of destabilising and further weakening the rights of research 
participants in developing countries – a prospect which all the 
parties to this controversy will want to avoid. 
I argue that support for Helsinki should be renewed, not abandoned, 
for three reasons: (i) the uncertain status of the UDBHR as a source 
of international law; (ii) upholding fundamental human rights does 
not require that universal standards of care should follow rigid and 
uniform templates on post-trial access to drugs and other benefits; 
and (iii) professional codes of practice, and Helsinki in particular, play 
a critical supporting role in ensuring that fundamental human rights 
are respected. Dialogue and co-operation, rather than institutional 
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and normative divisions, are essential for protecting research 
participants. 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights in international 
law
The UDBHR does not as yet have the status and authority of a legally 
binding document in international law. At this point, it is a statement 
of moral ideals and aspirations that merits serious attention because 
the document was issued by one of the UN agencies, but this is not 
sufficient to show that the moral ideals it states have the level of 
international support needed for it to be recognised as a source of 
law, let alone the authoritative, superior source of principles to guide 
the conduct of medical research in international law. 
The legal threshold is high. The declarations or resolutions of 
UN agencies may acquire the status of a recognised source of 
international law if, over time, there is evidence that the norms 
they embody reflect ‘international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law.’7 The International Court of Justice has 
interpreted this to mean that states have to follow the norm(s) 
out of a sense of legal obligation.8 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, is 
the clearest example of an aspirational text which has acquired 
the status of international law. 
Hitherto, Helsinki has become widely recognised as a standard-setting 
instrument for medical research worldwide, being embedded in 
numerous legislative texts and in the judgements of courts. Examples 
include the Clinical Trials Directive 2001, which is binding on all 
members of the European Union, and Judgments of the Supreme 
Court of Canada and US Federal Court. Various analyses are available.9,10 
In contrast, the UDBHR has yet to secure widespread adherence 
among states, acting out of a sense of legal obligation, in order to 
gain recognition as a legally binding source of law. Hitherto, the 
mixed and contested reception of the UDBHR points to a lack of clear 
and widespread endorsement for the norms it enshrines.11-14 
Therefore, rather than strengthening the rights of research 
participants in developing countries, calls to ditch Helsinki in favour 
of the UDBHR could weaken the internationally recognised standards 
of protection Helsinki sets out, in favour of a document which may or 
may not withstand the test of time as a legally binding source of law. 
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the 2008 version of Helsinki 
is at odds with the UDBHR. On the contrary, a fuller understanding of 
the UDBHR and its place in the hierarchy of human rights instruments 
shows that the UDBHR requires neither rigid universal standards of 
care nor uniform templates of post-trial access to drugs and benefit-
sharing, in order to comply with the protection of fundamental 
human rights in research. 
Fundamental human rights norms
The critics interpret the UDBHR as requiring rigid and uniform 
arrangements on post-trial access to drugs and other benefits. 
This, however, is questionable. The UDBHR itself, and its normative 
grounding and goals, have to be read consistently with the 
foundational human rights instruments cited in the text’s Preamble 
– most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
(1948) and the two legally binding treaties which followed, namely 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) adopted in 1966.15 The UDHR contains two overarching 
fundamental rights that are particularly relevant to the controversies 
over Helsinki and UDBHR: 
Equal dignity of the human person. All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights (Article 1 UDHR).
Non-discrimination. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status 
(Article 2 UDHR).
These principles are reflected in the Preambles and several of the 
Articles in the ICCPR and ICESCR. For instance, respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person is mentioned in the Preamble and Article 
10 ICCPR and the Preamble and Article 13 (right to education) ICESCR. 
Non-discrimination is expressly mentioned in several articles of the 
ICCPR, notably Article 4 (emergencies), Article 20 (limits on freedom of 
expression), Article 24 (rights of the child) and Article 26 (equality before 
the law). In the ICESCR, non-discrimination prominently opens the 
Covenant in Article 2, which imposes an overarching obligation of non-
discrimination on member states in respect of all the rights contained in 
the ICESCR. Article 2 ICESCR requires ‘that the rights enunciated in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as 
to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status’. 
The twin principles of the equal dignity of all persons and non-
discrimination are in turn reflected in the list of civil, political, 
economic, cultural and social rights contained in the original UDHR 
and the Covenants. Johannes Morsink, the US scholar and author of 
the authoritative and seminal work on the UDHR, has persuasively 
argued that these rights are interconnected. He holds that these 
rights are normatively grounded in the drafters’ shared view that 
protecting these rights is integral to facilitating human flourishing, 
individual self-realisation and the development of ‘human 
capabilities’.16 This also highlights the radical vision of human rights 
contained in the UDHR as a statement of entitlements, including not 
only the ‘negative’ civil and political rights of the enlightenment but 
‘positive’ social, economic and cultural rights as well.17 
Accordingly, and in the field of scientific research and health, the 
foundational moral and legal rights contained in the UDHR and the 
subsequent Covenants entail not only negative prohibitions on the 
conduct of research (Article 2 and 3 UDHR) but positive obligations 
too. This is reflected in the right of everyone to share in the benefits 
of scientific progress (Article 27 UDHR, Article 15 ICESCR). 
Although the subsequent treaties and obligations are directly 
addressed to member states, Morsink argues that due to the nature of 
the international legal order there is no such restriction on the range 
of duty holders in the UDHR. Who the duty holders may be in relation 
to the discharge of each particular right will vary and may include 
both state and non-state actors. For instance, in the case of the right 
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to education, duty holders may include parents, the community 
or the state. But as regards the nature of the obligations and their 
enforceability, there is an important distinction between the dual 
regime of human rights covered by the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
The UDBHR: A hybrid of negative and 
positive rights
The duties falling on member states that have ratified the ICCPR 
necessarily entail the adoption of national policies, laws and 
regulations to facilitate the protection and fulfilment of the rights. 
States whose organs (police, army, government officials) violate the 
rights contained in the ICCPR can be referred to the Human Rights 
Committee, which has jurisdiction to monitor the implementation of 
the ICCPR and hear individual complaints.18 
By contrast, economic, social and cultural rights are not directly 
enforceable. When the two covenants were adopted, it was 
acknowledged that the extent to which social and economic rights 
could be fulfilled would vary tremendously depending on the social 
and economic national context.15 Thus the legal obligation that the 
ICESCR imposes on member states is to take steps ‘towards achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights’ (Article 2). 
These steps, including the setting of targets and the means to 
achieve them, have to be evidenced in regular reports submitted 
to the UN’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR).19 As of 2008, the committee can hear individual complaints 
where member states acceded to the ICESCR, which grants the 
committee competence to receive and consider communications 
(GA resolution A/RES/63/117). But there is no sign that states are in a 
rush to recognise the committee’s jurisdiction. To date there are only 
8 ratifications, including by Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Slovakia and 
Spain, and 40 signatures from UN member states.
The UDBHR comprises a hybrid mix of the rights contained in the 
two covenants. Arguably, the elaboration of the normative content 
and nature of the legal obligations (hypothetically) attached in 
international law to the rights detailed in the UDBHR depends on 
whether the right in question falls within the general umbrella of civil 
and political rights in the ICCPR or the social and economic rights in 
the ICESCR. 
For instance, Articles 5 and 6 of the UDBHR enjoin respect for 
autonomy, and the individual’s right to choose and consent to 
medical treatment and research. These are a species of civil and 
political rights broadly relating to Article 7 ICCPR, which stipulates 
an absolute prohibition on torture and medical research without 
consent: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall 
be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation.’
These articles could be read to entail that states have an obligation (i) 
to take steps to prevent human rights contraventions by corporations 
that have their main office under their jurisdiction, and (ii) relating to 
the conduct of research which would be illegal in one country, but 
which owing to lack of legal protections is possible in another.20 In 
practice, because international law norms do not have automatic 
legal force in national laws, victims of wrongs arising from trials 
conducted in Nigeria have had to pursue a remedy in negligence in 
US courts, a process that can be extremely protracted and onerous 
for the victims.21 For instance, in Abdullahi v. Pfizer Inc. (January 2009) 
the US Court of Appeal, second circuit, held by a majority of 2:1 that 
US corporations are liable under the Aliens Tort Statute for breaches 
of international law committed abroad.22
By contrast, ‘positive’ rights that elaborate on the social and economic 
rights contained in the ICESCR, such as the right to health (Article 14) or 
benefit sharing (Article 15) UDBHR, do not impose absolute obligations 
on states, but variable obligations towards progressive realisation of 
the rights. Accordingly, it is implausible to read Article 15 UDBHR as 
requiring states to adopt a rigid and uniform template or standard on 
the conduct of clinical trials irrespective of local considerations. 
Certainly, the rights of research participants in a disadvantaged 
country will be violated if the design of the trial involves discrimination 
against the host population. This can happen either when placebos 
are used instead of best current treatment, and/or because post-
trial care is offered to other populations in the same or comparable 
trials without any reasonable justification, i.e. as in the HIV trials that 
originally prompted this debate.23 However, the use of placebos per 
se does not necessarily amount to a breach of human rights or a 
failure to confer a benefit. Indeed, when placebos are used in trials 
to find cheaper alternatives to existing, unaffordable formulations, 
the use of a placebo may even be justified as conferring a benefit on 
the local population, if the resources required for a trial against the 
‘current’ best proven treatment and the extended time frame would 
result in more lives being lost or harm being suffered. 
Thus, the minimalist, cost-benefit ratio approach that Temple 
advocates need not be in breach of human rights. However, it falls 
short of the expectations set out by Farida Shaheed, the UN Special 
Rapporteur, on Article 15 of the ICESCR in her report of 24 May 2012.24 
She specifically cites Article 15 of the UDBHR as a useful starting 
point, noting that ‘benefits resulting from any scientific research 
and its applications should be shared with society as a whole and 
within the international community, in particular with developing 
countries’. Shaheed describes ‘multiple forms’ of benefit sharing in 
paragraph 67 of her report: ‘special and sustainable assistance to, and 
acknowledgement of, the persons and groups that have taken part in 
the research; access to quality health care; provision of new diagnostic 
and therapeutic modalities or products stemming from research; 
support for health services; access to scientific and technological 
knowledge; and capacity-building facilities for research purposes’. 
In this light, it is difficult to see how the qualified and nuanced 
wording of Articles 17, 32 and 33 of the DoH may be inconsistent with 
the obligations entailed by fundamental human rights instruments, 
notably Article 15 ICESCR and Article 15 UDBHR. 
Article 17 HoD entails a commitment to ensuring protection of 
‘disadvantaged or vulnerable population(s) or community(/ies)’, 
stipulating that medical trials involving such populations are only 
justified where the research both addresses their health priorities 
and they stand a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of benefitting from it. Article 
32 explicitly delineates the two scenarios in which using placebos is 
acceptable: firstly, in instances where no current proven treatment 
exists, the use of placebos are justified in furthering research. 
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Secondly, placebos are permitted where necessary for determining 
‘the efficacy or safety of an intervention’, and receiving placebos 
must not put patients at risk of ‘serious or irreversible harm’. Article 
32 concludes with the warning that ‘Extreme care must be taken to 
avoid abuse of this option.’ 
Article 33 of the 2008 DoH states: ‘At the conclusion of the study, 
patients entered into the study are entitled to be informed about 
the outcome of the study and to share any benefits that result from 
it, for example, access to interventions identified as beneficial in the 
study or to other appropriate care or benefits.’ Thus, without using 
the language of ‘rights’, Article 33 nevertheless acknowledges these 
rights of participating patients. 
Codes of ethics and human rights
The fundamental human rights set out in human rights instruments 
are of a general nature, and do not detail the obligations entailed by 
a right or the means of ensuring its protection. Therefore, far from 
being a superfluous addition to human rights instruments, ethical 
codes of practice are essential. These codes elaborate detailed ethical 
standards which are developed and maintained by discipline-specific 
professional organisations. For example, the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has convened a Science 
and Human Rights Coalition initiative on Article 15 ICESCR, which 
demonstrates how productive links may be developed between 
professional codes of ethics and human rights. 
The DoH extensively lists specific ethical obligations attending the 
conduct of medical research, making it a necessary and important 
supplement to the human rights instruments whose weight and 
standing comes from decades of practice. UNESCO’s Bioethics 
Declaration has a long way to go to acquire equivalent credibility. 
Furthermore, the continued involvement and co-operation of 
millions of physicians on the ground is critical to ensure that the 
rights of research participants are protected. 
However, there are disputes over the relative status and authority 
of human rights instruments vis-à-vis professional codes of practice, 
as well as divisions between UN agencies (UNAIDS, WHO, UNESCO, 
ECOSOC, WIPO) and their respective declarations and norms. 
These disputes create confusion and uncertainty and allows key 
stakeholders to pick and choose which standards suit them best, at 
the expense of those already suffering grave inequalities. 
Bioethics is a novel expansion of UNESCO’s mission and competences 
in the field of education, science and culture. It has the potential to 
intersect with the mission and competences of other UN agencies 
in the areas of biomedical research, health and intellectual property 
rights, as well as the mission of non-governmental organisations and 
professional associations which have historically worked to promote 
ethics in scientific research. An important example of a recent initiative 
to revisit the UN Millennium goals which intersects with Article 15 
UDBHR is the Framework Convention on Global Health. This framework 
aims to set up norms for the enforcement of positive rights, to achieve 
more normative uniformity.25
Collaboration and dialogue between these institutions is crucial to 
ensure human rights are respected, as well as transparency about 
who UNESCO chooses to sponsor under its ‘Bioethics’ umbrella and 
engage in dialogue with, and why. At the time of writing, UNESCO 
is sponsoring one regional South American network, Redbioetica. 
There is no indication of why and how UNESCO has opted to sponsor 
this particular network and what criteria were applied to determine 
which members may be included or excluded. The worst-case 
scenario for disadvantaged populations in developing countries is 
for international organisations to work at odds with each other, and 
develop fragmented, overlapping and inconsistent norms. 
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